Overlapping International Environmental R&D Agreements with Transaction Costs∗

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Abstract: We examine the formation of multilateral, hub-and-spoke and bilateral international joint R&D agreements to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision produces two types of positive externalities: a global public good (i.e., reduction of CO2 emissions) and knowledge spillovers in joint R&D agreements. We utilize the perfectly-coalition-proof-Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria. Multilateral and hub-and-spoke coalitional structures are PCPNE, even in large economies containing all nations in the globe, in the absence of income transfers, for different values of transaction costs. With income transfers, fully participated multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands.

Keywords: coalition-proof equilibrium; overlapping coalitions; carbon capture and storage; hub-and-spoke; international environmental agreements.

JEL Classification: C7, D6, D7, H4, H7, Q4, R5

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1. Introduction

The Paris Agreement (2015) determines that the joint effort of its participants must prevent an increase of more than 2 degrees Celsius in the global temperature by the end of the century. It is nearly certain that such an ambitious goal can only be achieved by a combination of several carbon emission reduction strategies, including Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (see, e.g., “The Global Status of CCS: 2017”). CCS has tremendous potential to reduce global carbon emissions (see, e.g., de Coninck et al (2009), Herzog (2011) and Leach et al (2011)). However, wide CCS deployment requires some important actions or policies (see, e.g., de Coninck et al. (2009), Herzog (2011) and The Royal Society (2011)). Nations must incur large upfront costs to build facilities and transportation networks and must utilize regulatory incentives (e.g., carbon pricing). In addition, public and private sectors must coordinate efforts in research development and demonstration and coordinate actions in storage activities.

It is not surprising that Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, Korea, Norway, South Africa, the UK and the USA have been active in the formation of international joint CCS agreements (see, e.g., the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and the International Energy Agency’s Greenhouse Gas R&D Centre). Notably, China and the EU are “hubs” in the international CCS network, since they have entered into multiple bilateral and multilateral international agreements. For example, China has bilateral agreements with Australia, the EU, Japan and the USA and a multilateral agreement with the EU and Norway (see, e.g., Hagemann et al. (2011)).

The fact that China and the EU have entered into several bilateral and multilateral CCS agreements illustrates a major advantage of such a strategy. A large research network enables China or the EU to have access to new as well as complementary pieces of knowledge and reduce the likelihoods of inertia and redundancy in its R&D process. The amount of R&D spillovers enjoyed by a nation may significantly increase as it forms new bridges across nations. The Chinese and European hub-and-spoke networks provide empirical support to “chance combination theory” (see, e.g.,
Simonton (2004)) in that creative ideas emerge from combination of various pieces of knowledge and the expansion of a research network produces more knowledge.¹

However, in the case of CCS, there also appear to be important factors that limit the efficient size of the international research network. The inherent interdependency of the various research tasks in CCS (i.e., carbon capture, logistics and storage) implies that research teams need to be very cohesive to advance effective solutions to the intertwined complex problems that they face.² Cohesive research teams are those in which research collaborators are prone to cooperate in knowledge creation and diffusion because they have a great deal of trust on each other.³ Trust among research collaborators builds slowly because collaborators give preference to past and existing relationships to engaging in new collaborations.⁴ The argument is that researchers who contemplate new collaborations face substantial informational asymmetries with respect to each other’s skills, expertise and research effort. Therefore, the existence of informational asymmetries may reduce the impetus for continual expansion of research networks brought up by R&D sharing.

In this paper, we consider the benefits and costs associated with joint production of R&D that reduces carbon emissions. We examine both the efficiency and the stability of multilateral, hub-and-

¹ Several studies find that the size of a research team (i.e., research network size) is positively correlated to various types of indicators of number and quality of publications (see, e.g., Defazio et al (2009)).

² The knowledge underlying CCS projects seem to fit well the description of complex knowledge in Sorenson et al. (2006). Complexity is defined “…in terms of the level of interdependence inherent in the subcomponents of a piece of knowledge…Interdependence arises when a subcomponent significantly affects the contribution of one or more other subcomponents to the functionality of a piece of knowledge. When subcomponents are interdependent, a change in one may require the adjustment, inclusion or replacement of others for a piece of knowledge to remain effective.” (Sorenson et al (2006), p. 995)

³ See, e.g., Forti et al. (2013). These authors find that research teams are more productive the more cohesive they are. This finding gives support to the idea that strong ties among research collaborators promote trust and cooperation and these factors enable these researchers to effectively enhance mutual exchange of highly sensitive and fine-grained information. Their result adds to the controversy of which weak or strong ties among researchers are more important for knowledge creation and diffusion. As hypothesized by Granovetter (1973), weak ties among individuals may facilitate bridge formation and information diffusion.

spoke and isolated bilateral agreements. We focus on R&D production that emerges from interactions among researchers. Specifically, we examine situations in which researchers’ interactions produce what Fershtman and Gandal (2011) call “direct project spillovers” and “indirect project spillovers.” We follow the basic premise of the “coauthor model” developed by Jackson and Wollinsky (1996) that the benefits of the interaction between a pair of research collaborators are both the benefit that each collaborator puts into the project and the benefit associated with synergy. The more time the collaborators spend together, the greater the amount of synergy and thus the greater the collective benefit from collaboration.

As for the costs of international joint R&D activities, we consider the cost of hiring inputs (labor and capital) and the transaction costs associated with relative efficiency losses, measured in terms of potential R&D product foregone. We account for two potential sources of relative efficiency losses. First, international research interactions may be less efficient than domestic ones due to weaker ties between any pair of researcher collaborators, since moral hazard and adverse-selection issues may be more severe. We call the loss of efficiency due to weaker ties “relational attrition” cost. Second, the total relational attrition cost faced by any researcher should be proportional to the number of

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5 In Fershtman and Gandal (2011), direct project spillovers “exist whenever there are knowledge spillovers between projects that are directly connected, that is they have common contributors” and indirect project spillovers “exist whenever there are knowledge spillovers between projects that are not directly connected, that is, projects for which there are no common contributors.” In our multilateral R&D agreements there exist direct project spillovers only. In our hub-and-spoke R&D agreements, there are both direct and indirect project spillovers. Fershtman and Gandal find evidence of direct and indirect project spillovers in their analysis of open-source software.

6 International research collaboration is also more likely to be less efficient than domestic research collaboration because of the extra burden faced by researchers in traveling long distances and dealing with differences in time zones (which affect the proper times for one-on-one communication over the internet) and in culture and social working habits.
international collaborators that this individual possesses, since coordinating relational issues becomes more complex as the number of partners expands.\textsuperscript{7}

We obtain several novel results. First, if a joint R&D agreement does not allow transfers, knowledge spillovers flow freely within agreements but research collaborators do not internalize externalities. Second, a nation that stands alone in the presence of an isolated bilateral arrangement necessarily enjoys an equilibrium payoff that is lower than the common equilibrium payoff earned by the bilateral research collaborators. Even though the stand-alone nation “free rides” on the emission reductions produced by the bilateral research collaborators, it does not partake on the benefits produced by R&D sharing. R&D sharing is an excludable club good. The “R&D clubs” examined in this paper have the desirable properties of the club mechanisms defended by Nordhaus (2015), even though the club members are not able to “punish” non-club members. Third, if joint R&D agreements allow transfers, the transfer mechanisms align the incentives of research collaborators in that they find it desirable to produce R&D at levels that internalize both types of positive externalities within an agreement. Fourth, in contrast to the situation without transfers, a nation that stands alone in the presence of an isolated bilateral arrangement now enjoys an equilibrium payoff that is higher than the common equilibrium payoff earned by the bilateral collaborators. The reason for this is that the benefits from free riding enjoyed by the stand-alone nation outweigh the benefits produced by R&D sharing. Finally, conditional on whether transfers the joint R&D agreements allow transfers, one obtains significantly different equilibrium payoff rankings and PCPNE for large economies.\textsuperscript{8}

Joint CCS agreements provide just one of the motivations behind the emergence of hub-and-spoke networks among nations. Indeed, perhaps, the greatest motivation for the development of such

\textsuperscript{7} For example, in his study of R&D performance carried out in one of the U.S. armed services’ largest R&D stations in the early 1960’s, Friedlander (1966) finds that trust among team members is negatively affected by team size.

\textsuperscript{8} For a comprehensive analysis of network formation in the presence of transfers, see Bloch and Jackson (2007).
networks is trade expansion: Hur et al. (2010) find that nations experience a significant increase in the volume of exports when they become hubs in overlapping free trade agreements (FTAs). Not surprisingly, some nations have been very active in establishing bilateral FTAs with several nations, and hence effectively becoming hubs in networks of overlapping bilateral free trade agreements. Consider, for example, Canada and China. Canada has bilateral FTAs with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Panama and Peru. China has bilateral FTAs with Chile, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Peru and Singapore. The existence and growth of overlapping free trade agreements have generated a sizable literature in international economics.\(^9\)

Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) study sequential negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements and show that hub-and-spoke networks are likely to be more effective in delivering multilateral free trade than the alternative system of customs unions. They also show that there is incentive for a nation to be a hub, since the hub nation enjoys greater welfare than the spoke nations in equilibrium. Like Mukunoki and Tachi (2006), we show that the hub nation in a green technology agreement without income transfers fares better than the spoke nations. Unlike Mukunoki and Tachi (2006), we also consider a setting in which income transfers are allowed. We show that the ‘hub-incentive effect’ disappears if coalitions implement income transfers, since hub and spoke nations get the same level of welfare in equilibrium. Our paper differs from Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) in many other significant respects, including the existence of crowding costs in green technology agreements and the employed equilibrium concept.

Our paper contributes to the vast literature on international environmental agreements (see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006, 2015), Chander (2007) and Osmani and Tol (2009)) and to the literature on environmental R&D (see, e.g., Greaker and Hoel (2011) and Golombek and Hoel (2011)). The

\(^9\) See, e.g., Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) and Saggi and Yildiz (2010). For additional references, see these papers and Hur et al. (2010).
approach we utilize here deviates from the ones utilized in the literature on international environmental agreements because coalition formation fully accounts for individual and collective deviations in the presence of perfect foresight in a setting where players are able to have unlimited pre-communication and to establish non-binding agreements. Coalition-proofness is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. As for our key contributions to the literature on environmental R&D, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to model the production of collaborative R&D in overlapping international research networks and therefore consider the efficiency and stability of multilateral and hub-and-spoke international green R&D agreements.

We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 builds the basic model for an economy featuring three nations. Section 3 determines PCPNE for settings in which R&D agreements prohibit or allow transfers. Section 4 provides an analysis of global welfare. Section 5 examines PCPNE with and without transfers for large economies. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

2. Basic Model

We follow Silva and Zhu (2013), who extend the concept of Perfectly Coalition-Proof-Nash Equilibrium (PCPNE) advanced by Bernheim et al. (1987) to settings in which overlapping coalitions may coexist. We show this extension in Appendix A. It employs the perfectly coalition-proof concept to the sets of players produced by the union of intersecting (i.e., overlapping) sets of players.

Suppose that $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ denotes the set of all players. In addition to $N$, the subsets of the set of all players are the singletons, $\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$ and the pairs $\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}$. The standard coalition-proof concept is applicable to all coalitional structures except to the overlapping ones, in which one nation is a hub. The extended concept of Silva and Zhu (2013) is applicable to the overlapping coalitional structures: it is employed over the union of the overlapping bilateral coalitions; namely the set $\{1, 2, 3\}$. Consider, for example, the coalitional structure in which nation 1 is a hub and nations 2 and 3 are spokes; that is, the coalitions $\{1, 2\}$ and $\{1, 3\}$ coexist in equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium for this structure is coalition-proof if and only if there is no individual nor
collective incentive to deviate; that is, player 1 has no incentive to exit either coalition, and players 2 and 3 have no incentives to exit their respective coalitions in order to stand alone or to form the bilateral coalition \( \{2,3\} \). The latter is one of the possible self-enforcing sub-coalitions that can be produced from the set \( \{1,2,3\} \).

The game considered here is a strategic network formation game. We formulate a multistage game, in which the first stage is a participation stage. If the joint R&D agreements prohibit transfers, the game contains two stages: following the participation stage, there is a contribution stage. If the joint R&D agreements allow transfers, the game also includes a third stage in which coalitions implement transfers. Formally, the participation stage can be described as follows. For a game where \( N = \{1,2,3\} \), a pointing game \( \Gamma \) is a list \((N,(S_i)_{i \in N},U_i)\), where \( S_i = \{0,1\}^{N \setminus \{i\}} = \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\} \) for each \( i \in N \) (a representative element \( s_i = \{s_{ij},s_{ik}\} \in S_i \) describes the countries that country \( i \) is pointing towards to initiate an agreement, and \( s_{ij} = 1 \) means that country \( i \) selects country \( j \) while \( s_{ij} = 0 \) means that country \( i \) does not select country \( j \) ) and \( U_i(s_i,s_{-i}) = u_i(\{i,j\} \subset N : s_{ij} = s_{ik} = 1) \) for each \( i \in N \). We later extend the model to allow for a larger number of nations. For \( N = \{1,2,3,\ldots,Z\} \), where \( Z \geq 4 \), and multiple coalitions \( \{T_1,T_2,\ldots,T_K\} \), let \( S_i = \{0,1,2,\ldots\} \) and \( T_k(s) = \{W \subseteq N : i \in T \Rightarrow s_i = k\} \) for all \( k = \{1,2,\ldots\} \). The equilibrium concept is PCPNE.

In the basic model, our economy consists of three identical nations, with each nation being indexed by \( i, \ i=1,2,3 \). There is one consumer in each nation. The utility consumer \( i \) gets from consumption of \( x_i \) units of a numeraire good and \( G = \sum_{j=1}^{3} g_j \) units of a pure public good (say, reduction in global carbon dioxide emissions through CCS technology) is \( u_i = x_i + v(G) = x_i + G(1 - G/2), \ i=1,2,3 \). The budget constraint for consumer \( i \) is \( x_i + c(q_i) = I \), where \( c(q_i) \) is nation \( i \)'s cost of contributing \( q_i \) units of R&D utilizing its own resources (i.e., working alone) and \( I > 0 \) is nation \( i \)'s total income. We assume that \( c(q_i) = q_i^2/2 \). We also
assume that $I$ is sufficiently large so that all Nash equilibria examined below are characterized by strictly positive consumption of the numeraire good.\(^{10}\)

We assume that one unit of carbon-reducing R&D product reduces one unit of carbon emission. If nation $i$ is an independent R&D producer, its contribution to carbon-emission reduction is equal to $q_i$. If nation $i$ collaborates with at least one nation in R&D production, nation $i$’s contribution to carbon-emission reduction is equal to $g_i = z_{i-} + q_i$ (in the absence of relational attrition), where $z_{i-}$ denotes the total spillover R&D flow that $i$ enjoys from its collaborators. We follow previous works on cooperative R&D with spillovers in oligopolies and R&D teams. Nation $i$’s R&D output increases on its collaborators’ R&D efforts due to knowledge sharing (see, e.g., Spence (1984), Katz (1986), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Yi and Shin (2000) and Huang (2009)) and collaborative problem solving, learning and feedbacks (see, e.g., Friedlander (1966), Dailey (1978) and Bruns (2013)). We assume that $z_{i-} = \sum_{j \neq i} q_j$, where $\sum_{j \neq i} q_j$ is the total R&D effort that $i$’s collaborators produce.

Having discussed the key components of R&D products, let us now turn to the impact of relational attrition on R&D products. Relational attrition reduces the R&D output produced by a nation that is engaged in R&D collaboration. Let $A_i$ denote the relational attrition faced by $i$ in its R&D team. Let $e_i = e(A_i)$ be the relational efficiency level experienced by $i$ in its R&D team. For simplicity, we assume that $e(A_i) = (1 + A_i)^{-1}$. This implies that $e_i = 1$ if $A_i = 0$ and $e_i \in (0,1)$ if $A_i > 0$. Let $A_i = a(n_i - 1)$, where $a \geq 0$ is the rate of relational attrition and $n_i$ denotes the size of $i$’s R&D team (including self).\(^{11}\) Hence, $n_i - 1$ is the size of $i$’s R&D team excluding self.

\(^{10}\) These details of our basic model are widely used in the environmental economics literature which examines transboundary pollution issues (see, e.g., Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006), Nagase and Silva (2007), Silva and Yamaguchi (2010), Silva and Zhu (2009)).

\(^{11}\) Formally, the size of $i$’s R&D team can be defined as follows. Given a nondirected graph $\gamma$, let $\eta_i(\gamma) = \{j \in N : \{i,j\} \in \gamma\}$ be the set of $i$’s collaborators under $\gamma$. Let $n_i = |\eta_i(\gamma) \cup \{i\}|$ be the cardinality of $i$’s R&D team (which includes $i$).
This symmetric formulation assumes that \( i \) faces the same loss in efficiency from relational attrition through its research interactions with any of its R&D collaborators.\(^{12}\) Nation \( i \)'s relational efficiency rate works as a scaling function: it transforms nation \( i \)'s potential R&D output into nation \( i \)'s actual R&D output: 

\[
g_i = \left[1 + a(n_i - 1)\right]^{-1} \left[q_i + \sum_{j \neq i} q_j\right].\(^{13}\)
\]

3. **PCPNE analysis**

The participation stage may produce several coalitional structures depending on the values of the parameters of the model. We need to consider all possible coalitional structures that may result in the participation stage and then compare the equilibrium payoffs in order to determine the PCPNE. We examine two different settings: (i) without transfers within coalitions; and (ii) with transfers within coalitions.

3.1. **PCPNE without transfers**

In the participation stage, the possible coalitional structures are:

- (i) the singleton structure – all nations are independent (i.e., stand alone);
- (ii) the bilateral structure – two nations belong to a coalition and one nation stands alone;
- (iii) the hub-and-spoke structure – one nation forms bilateral coalitions with the other two nations (i.e., the hub) and the latter form bilateral coalitions with the hub only (i.e., the spokes); and

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\(^{12}\) We have considered different specifications for the efficiency function, but the qualitative results regarding payoff rankings remain the same. Hence, we chose the specification that is used in the text because of its simplicity and its intuitive appeal since \( e^{-1}(a,2) - e^{-1}(a,1) = a \); that is, the marginal efficiency loss associated with increasing a nation’s network size from two to three nations is equal to the attrition rate. As one nation is added to the network with two nations, it makes sense to think that the implied efficiency loss is equal to the additional loss that the extra nation imposes in terms of attrition; namely, a quantity equal to the attrition rate.

\(^{13}\) Bruns (2013) notes that expert and collaborative practices reinforce each other and are also glued and influenced by the coordination practice that emerges within R&D teams. Hence, we postulate that relational attrition in collaborative practice should affect the entire R&D production process, scaling down the potential R&D output that each researcher can produce (see also Forti et al. (2013)).
(iv) the multilateral structure – each nation forms bilateral coalitions with the other two nations. In our framework, this is equivalent to the Grand Coalition.

Consider the multilateral network. In the Nash equilibrium for the contribution game, contributions are determined according to the first order conditions, $\nu'(G^M) = (1 + 2a)c'(q_i^M(\cdot))$, where $q_i^M$ denotes nation $i$’s R&D effort, $G^M = \sum_{i=1}^{3} g_i^M$ denotes the total amount of the global public good and $g_i^M$ represents nation $i$’s R&D product. The symmetry in interactions implies that all nations earn the same payoff in the Nash equilibrium for the contribution game, $u_i^M = I + \nu(G^M) - c(q_i^M)$, $i = 1, 2, 3$.

In a hub-and-spoke network, only the hub interacts directly with the other nations (the spokes). In this case, there is asymmetry in interactions, since the hub enjoys R&D spillovers from both spokes and each spoke enjoys R&D spillovers from the hub only. The asymmetry in interactions implies that in the Nash equilibrium for the contribution game the hub earns a higher payoff than the spokes. This important result is gathered in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1.** For all $a > 0$, a hub nation’s welfare is higher than a spoke nation’s welfare.

**Proof.** Consider the hub-and-spoke network in which nation 1 is the hub. Let $q_i^H$, $i = 1, 2, 3$, denote the Nash equilibrium R&D output levels. Let $q_i^H$, $i = 1, 2, 3$, denote the nations’ own R&D contributions in the Nash equilibrium. The conditions that characterize the Nash equilibrium are

$$\nu'(G) = (1 + 2a)c'(q_i^H(\cdot)),$$  \hspace{1cm} (1a)

$$\nu'(G) = (1 + a)c'(q_m^H(\cdot)),$$  \hspace{1cm} (1b)

Equations (1b) imply that $q_2^H = q_3^H$. Equations (1a) and (1b), the crowding properties of the efficiency function and the strict convexity of the cost function imply that $q_1^H < q_m^H$, $m = 2, 3$. To see this, note that $(1 + 2a)c'(q_i^H) = (1 + a)c'(q_m^H)$ is implied by equations (1a) and (1b). Hence, $c'(q_i^H)/c'(q_m^H) = (1 + a)/(1 + 2a) < 1$ for all $a > 0$. Since this implies that $c'(q_i^H) < c'(q_m^H)$ for all $a > 0$ and $c''(\cdot) > 0$, we obtain $q_1^H < q_2^H = q_3^H$ for all $a > 0$. The equilibrium payoff
earned by the hub nation is $u_i^H = I + v(G^H) - c(q_i^H)$, where $G^H = \sum_{i=1}^{3} g_i^H$. The equilibrium payoff for a spoke nation is $u_m^H = I + v(G^H) - c(q_m^H)$, $m = 2,3$. It follows that $u_i^H > u_m^H$ for all $a > 0$ because $q_m^H > q_i^H$ for all $a > 0$ and $c'(\cdot) > 0$. ■

The hub premium follows from the fact that the hub nation spends fewer resources to produce R&D than the spoke nations when the attrition rate is positive. This result is consistent with the result obtained by Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) in that a hub enjoys a premium relative to a spoke, even though the essential details that generate our result are quite different from the essential details that lead to their result.

In any isolated bilateral network, the stand-alone nation does not enjoy R&D spillovers. The nations that form a bilateral agreement enjoy R&D spillovers from each other. Thus, in the Nash equilibrium for the contribution game, the equilibrium payoffs for the nations that form a bilateral agreement are always the same. The following proposition informs us that in the Nash equilibrium for the contribution game the stand-alone nation is never better off than the nations that form a bilateral agreement:

**Proposition 2.** The equilibrium payoff for the stand-alone nation in the contribution game is never greater than the equilibrium payoffs for the nations that belong to the bilateral technological agreement. The stand-alone nation is worse off than the other nations whenever $a > 0$.

**Proof.** Consider the isolated bilateral network in which nations 1 and 2 collaborate and nation 3 stands alone. Let $g_i^H$, $i = 1,2,3$, denote the Nash equilibrium green R&D product levels. Let $q_i^H$, $i = 1,2,3$, denote the nations’ own R&D contributions in the Nash equilibrium. The first-order conditions that characterize the Nash equilibrium are

$$v'(G) = (1 + a) c'(q_i^H) , \quad h = 1, 2 , \quad (2a)$$

$$v'(G) = c'(q_3^H) . \quad (2b)$$
The equilibrium payoffs are $u_h^p = I + \nu(G^p) - c(h^p)$, $h = 1, 2$, and $u_j^p = I + \nu(G^p) - c(j^p)$. Hence, $u_h^p \geq u_j^p$ if and only if $q_j^p \geq q_h^p$, $h = 1, 2$. But, $q_j^p \geq q_h^p$, $h = 1, 2$, because $c' > 0$. If $a = 0$, $e^{-1}(a, 1) = 1$ and $q_h^p = q_j^p$, $h = 1, 2$. If $a > 0$, $e^{-1}(a, 1) > 1$ and $q_j^p > q_h^p$, $h = 1, 2$.

Let us now determine the PCPNE. Anticipating the Nash equilibria payoffs for the contribution games, each nation decides which coalitions it will join, if any, in the network formation stage. To determine the PCPNE, we must compare the Nash equilibria payoffs for the contribution games.

The direct R&D spillovers in the multilateral network should provide each nation with an equilibrium payoff that is greater than the lowest equilibrium payoff that any hub-and-spoke arrangement produces – namely, the common payoff earned by the spokes – for a sufficiently small attrition rate. This is the relevant condition because two nations can effectively deny another nation a high payoff in a particular equilibrium by selecting another equilibrium in which both are better off. By a similar argument, the hub-and-spoke arrangement becomes superior to the multilateral arrangement for the spokes if the attrition is sufficiently high. The equilibrium for the hub-and-spoke arrangement then becomes coalition proof if the common equilibrium payoffs that the spokes earn are higher than the payoffs that these nations obtain in the equilibrium for the setting with one isolated bilateral agreement. This should be possible since the hub-and-spoke agreement provides direct (for the hub) and indirect R&D spillover benefits relative to the restricted direct bilateral R&D spillover benefits enjoyed by the members of the isolated bilateral agreement. This is indeed the case for an interval of attrition rates, as the proposition below demonstrates. Finally, by continuity, the bilateral arrangement is coalition proof for another interval of attrition rates. The upper attrition rate of this interval is the level at which the equilibrium payoff for the nations in the bilateral agreement is just equal to the equilibrium common equilibrium payoff that each nation can earn in the arrangement in which all nations stand alone. Figure 1 illustrates the results.
Figure 1. Nash equilibrium payoff levels without transfers

**Proposition 3.** For an interval of sufficiently small attrition rates, the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium for the multilateral arrangement. For an interval of higher attrition rates, the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium for the hub-and-spoke arrangement. For another interval of even higher attrition rates, the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium for the arrangement containing an isolated bilateral arrangement. Finally, for an interval of sufficiently high attrition rates, the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium for the arrangement in which all nations stand alone.

**Proof.** Let $u^M$ and $u^S$ denote the Nash equilibrium payoffs in the multilateral and stand-alone networks, respectively. From Proposition 1, $u_1^H = u_2^H = u_3^H$ for $a = 0$, and $u_1^H > u_2^H = u_3^H$ for $a \in (0,1]$. From Proposition 2, $u_1^P = u_2^P = u_3^P$ for $a = 0$, and $u_1^P > u_2^P = u_3^P$ for $a \in (0,1]$. Combining the various Nash equilibria payoffs, it follows that the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is: (i) the Nash equilibrium for the multilateral coalition structure for $a \in [0,0.152027]$, since
\[ u^M = \max \left[ u^H_1, u^H_2, u^H_3, u^P_1, u^P_2, u^P_3, u^S \right] \text{ for } a \in \left[ 0, 1/9 \right), u^M = u^H_1 \text{ for } a = 1/9, u^H_1 > u^M \text{ for } a \in \left( 1/9, 1 \right], \]

\[ u^M = u^H_2 = u^H_3 > \max \left[ u^P_1, u^P_2, u^P_3, u^S \right] \text{ for } a = 0.152027; (ii) \text{ the Nash equilibrium for the hub-and-spoke arrangement for } a \in \left[ 0.152027, 0.185142 \right], \]

\[ u^H_2 = u^H_3 > \max \left[ u^M, u^P_1, u^P_2, u^P_3, u^S \right] \text{ for } a \in \left( 0.152027, 0.185142 \right) \text{ and } u^H_2 = u^H_3 = u^P_1 = u^P_2 \text{ for } a = 0.185142; (iii) \text{ the Nash equilibrium for the arrangement containing an isolated bilateral agreement for } a \in \left( 0.185142, 0.459224 \right), \]

\[ u^P_1 = u^P_2 > \max \left[ u^H_1, u^H_2, u^M, u^P_1, u^P_2, u^S \right] \text{ for } a \in \left( 0.185142, 0.459224 \right) \text{ and } u^P_1 = u^P_2 = u^S \text{ for } a = 0.459224; \text{ and (iv) the Nash equilibrium for the arrangement containing singletons for } a \in \left[ 0.459224, 1 \right] \text{ since } u^S > \max \left[ u^H_1, u^H_2, u^H_3, u^M, u^P_1, u^P_2, u^P_3, u^S \right] \text{ for } a \in \left( 0.459224, 1 \right) \text{ (see Figure 1 and Appendix B).} \]

3.2. PCPNE with transfers

We now determine the PCPNE for international agreements in which international income transfers are feasible. Each coalition determines its international transfers. The optimal transfers within any coalition equate the payoffs of the coalition members. When coalition members choose R&D efforts, in the second stage, they anticipate that transfers equate payoffs. Formally, we consider three-stage games of complete but imperfect information. The first and second stages are as before. In the third stage, coalitions implement transfers (see Appendix E for details).

The multilateral and hub-and-spoke arrangements internalize both types of externalities. The critical difference between these arrangements is the fact that the multilateral arrangement connects all nations while the hub-and-spoke arrangement connects the hub to the spokes, but the spokes do not connect. This implies that for sufficiently small attrition rates, the equilibrium for the multilateral arrangement is Pareto superior to the equilibrium arrangement for the hub-and-spoke arrangement.

The equilibrium for the multilateral arrangement is not self-enforcing. For an interval of sufficiently low attrition rates, a single nation benefits from deviating from this arrangement and the remaining nations also benefit from sticking together because the common equilibrium payoffs that
two nations earn in the isolated bilateral agreement is at least as high as the payoffs these nations obtain in the stand-alone. Interestingly, when the common equilibrium payoff for the nations in the isolated bilateral agreement equals the stand-alone equilibrium payoff, it becomes individually rational for the free riding nation to “broker” an agreement with the other two nations in order to form the hub-and-spoke arrangement. Since all nations in the hub-and-spoke arrangement internalize externalities, the common equilibrium payoff for such an arrangement falls less quickly with the attrition rate than the common equilibrium payoff earned by the nations that belong to the isolated bilateral agreement. Hence, all three nations find it advantageous to select the equilibrium for the hub-and-spoke arrangement for a subsequent interval of attrition rates. Once the attrition rate erodes all benefits from R&D sharing, the CPNE becomes the equilibrium for the setting in which all nations stand alone in R&D production. Figure 2 illustrates the results.

Figure 2. Nash equilibrium payoff levels with transfers
Proposition 4. For sufficiently small attrition rates, the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium for the setting in which there is an isolated bilateral agreement. As attrition rates increase, the perfectly coalition-proof equilibria are first the equilibrium for the hub-and-spoke arrangement and later the equilibrium for the setting in which all nations stand alone.

Proof. Let $u^M$, $u^H$ and $u^*$ denote the Nash equilibrium payoffs for the multilateral, hub-and-spoke and isolated bilateral networks, respectively. Consider the isolated bilateral network in which nations 1 and 2 collaborate and nation 3 stands alone in what follows. Combining the perfect Nash equilibria payoffs for the relevant structures, we find that the perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibrium structure is: (i) the perfect Nash equilibrium for the setting in which there is an isolated bilateral agreement for $a \in [0, 0.41018]$ since $u^S > \max [u^H, u^M]$ for $a \in [0, 0.41018]$; (ii) the perfect Nash equilibrium for the hub-and-spoke arrangement for $a \in (0.41018, 0.513799]$, since $u^H > \max [u^M, u^S, u^S]$ for $a \in (0.41018, 0.513799]$ and $u^H = u^S$ for $a = 0.41018$; and (iii) the Nash equilibrium for the arrangement with singletons for $a \in [0.513799, 1]$ since $u^S > \max [u^H, u^M, u^S]$ for $a \in (0.513799, 1]$ (see also Figure 2 and Appendix C).

4. Global Welfare Analysis

We now consider global welfare levels when transfers are not allowed and when agreements allow transfers. We let superscript $C$ index the global welfare level for each relevant coalition structure, $C = H, M, P, S$ when agreements do not allow transfers and $C = H^*, M^*, P^*, S^*$ when agreements allow transfers. The global welfare level is denoted by $W^C = \sum_{i=1}^{3} u^C_i$.

We compute the global welfare levels as functions of the attrition rate. Figure 3 provides the global welfare curves and enables us to derive the following ranking of global welfare levels:

(i) $W^H > \max [W^S, W^P, W^H]$ for $a \in [0, 0.135793]$;
(ii) \( W^H > \max \left[ W^S, W^P, W^M \right] \) for \( a \in (0.135793, 0.238574) \);

(iii) \( W^P > \max \left[ W^S, W^H, W^M \right] \) for \( a \in (0.238574, 0.371021) \);

(iv) \( W^S > \max \left[ W^H, W^M \right] \) for \( a \in (0.371021, 1) \).

When agreements allow transfers, the ranking of global welfare levels is as follows:

(i) \( W^{M*} > \max \left[ W^S, W^{P*}, W^{H*} \right] \) for \( a \in [0, 0.157355] \);

(ii) \( W^{H*} > \max \left[ W^S, W^{P*}, W^{M*} \right] \) for \( a \in (0.157355, 0.391117) \);

(iii) \( W^{P*} > \max \left[ W^S, W^{H*}, W^{M*} \right] \) for \( a \in (0.391117, 0.41018) \);

(iv) \( W^{H*} > \max \left[ W^S, W^{M*} \right] \) for \( a \in (0.41018, 0.513799) \);

(v) \( W^S > \max \left[ W^{H*}, W^{M*} \right] \) for \( a \in (0.513799, 1] \).

The ranking of global welfare levels when agreements do not allow transfers capture the advantage of teamwork for sufficiently small attrition rates. As expected, the greatest benefit from teamwork is in the multilateral setting. The second-best and third-best situations are the hub-and-spoke network and the isolated bilateral agreement, respectively. When agreements allow transfers, on the other hand, we observe a surprising sort of events. Unlike the well-behaved ranking order for the settings without transfers, we now see that the global welfare level in the setting with an isolated bilateral agreement exceeds the global welfare level in the hub-and-spoke network for an interval of attrition rates, even though for smaller attrition rates the reverse is true. The nation that stands alone nation in the setting with an isolated bilateral agreement enjoys an equilibrium payoff that is larger than the common payoff earned by all nations in the hub-and-spoke network. In addition, for an interval of attrition rates, the difference between the equilibrium payoff for the stand-alone nation and the equilibrium payoff earned by the average nation in the hub-and-spoke exceeds the difference between the sum of equilibrium payoffs for the remaining hub-and-spoke nations and the sum of equilibrium payoffs for the bilateral collaborators in the isolated bilateral agreement.

One can understand the welfare analysis above in terms of what a global planner can achieve if he/she has the power to command the nations to collaborate or not in green R&D production. When
collaboration improves welfare, the planner can choose which collaboration network (i.e., multilateral, hub-and-spoke or isolated bilateral depicted) should be formed in order to take advantage of knowledge spillovers. In a more realistic scenario, however, the nations are free to make their own coordination decisions. The coalition structures that materialize are those that Propositions 3 and 4 predict. Hence, a non-interventionist global planner would have to be content with the global welfare levels that result from the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria.

Figure 3. Total welfare

Close inspection of Figure 3 reveals an interesting, welfare-improving, avenue for policy intervention by a global planner, which does not violate the nations’ ability to make their own coordination choices. Proposition 4 informs us that the Nash equilibrium for the setting with multilateral agreements is not coalition proof. Proposition 3, on the other hand, tells us that for sufficiently small attrition rates the Nash equilibrium for the setting with multilateral agreements is coalition proof. Hence, if a global planner is capable of deciding whether agreements should allow
transfers, there is a window of opportunity to exercise his/her power for sufficiently small attrition rates. By prohibiting transfers for an interval of sufficiently small attrition rates, the planner induces the nations to select the Nash equilibrium for the setting with multilateral agreements without transfers. The global welfare improvement resulting from this smart prohibition choice is clear in Figure 3 (see also Appendix D). It is equal to the horizontal distance between the thin-blue curve and the thick-green curve for sufficiently small attrition levels (i.e., those at which the height of the thin-blue curve is at least as large as the height of the thick-green curve). This occurs for \( a < 0.0938257 \). Figure 3 also makes it clear that the global planner should allow transfers within agreements for large values of the attrition rate.

**Proposition 5.** For sufficiently small attrition rates, constrained global welfare levels improve when green R&D agreements prohibit transfers because multilateral agreements without transfers are self-enforcing. For larger attrition rates, constrained global welfare levels are maximal when green R&D agreements allow transfers.

5. **Large economies**

In this section, we extend our analysis to settings in which \( N = \{1, 2, 3, ..., Z\} \), where there are \( Z \geq 4 \) nations. We consider both green R&D agreements in which transfers are allowed and in which transfers are prohibited. Due to its ubiquity in the literature and to its symmetric features, we first examine large economies in the presence of income transfers.

5.1. **Large economies with transfers**

Let \( Z - D \) be the number of nations that collaborate in green R&D production by being members of either hub-and-spoke or multilateral international research networks, where \( D, \ 1 \leq D < Z \), is the number of stand-alone nations. We allow the formation of multiple coalitions. To fixate ideas and derive some intuition, we first consider the particular case in which the attrition rate is zero. We later consider the general model in which the attrition rate lies between zero and one.
Table 1. Stable Agreements for $a = 0$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Z</th>
<th>$3 \sim 6$</th>
<th>$7 \sim 13$</th>
<th>$14 \sim 23$</th>
<th>$24 \sim 36$</th>
<th>$37 \sim 51$</th>
<th>$52 \sim 70$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z−D</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Z</th>
<th>$71 \sim 91$</th>
<th>$92 \sim 115$</th>
<th>$116 \sim 142$</th>
<th>$143 \sim 172$</th>
<th>$173 \sim 204$</th>
<th>…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z−D</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows the results of our analysis under the assumption that there is no attrition. For economies of sizes 3 to 6, the PCPNE feature bilateral agreements and 1 to 4 stand-alone nations. For economies of sizes 7 to 13, the PCPNE are trilateral agreements with 4 to 10 stand-alone nations. Finally, for economies of sizes 173 to 204, the PCPNE feature multilateral agreements containing 12 nations and 161 to 192 stand-alone nations.

One important result of the analysis is that the nations form at most one coalition. We also find that the sizes of the stable multilateral agreements increase at a decreasing rate as the size of the global economy increases. These implications follow from the fact that technological spillovers associated with collaborative R&D efforts flow to nations that join R&D agreements only. In other words, the collaborative R&D activity generates a nonrivalrous and nonexcludable knowledge public good for the members of an agreement, but outsiders do not enjoy access to this public good.\textsuperscript{14} Outsiders, on the other hand, enjoy the by-product, which results from knowledge creation in green R&D agreements. This by-product is the collective carbon emission reductions promoted by the members.

\textsuperscript{14} See Silva and Kahn (1993) for an early analysis of exclusion incentives in voluntary public good provision in which coalition proofness is utilized to select a stable Nash equilibrium.
of the green R&D agreement. Therefore, there is a tension between the incentive of being a member in a multilateral agreement and the incentive to free ride on the emission reductions promoted by the collective efforts of the multilateral agreement.

The analysis demonstrates that the tension between the incentive to join the “club” and the incentive to free ride produces the unconventional finding that the size of a stable multilateral coalition increases with the size of the economy. Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006), whose model builds on the model advanced by Barrett (1994), demonstrate that the stable coalition involves no more than four countries. More recently, Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2015) demonstrate that if the nations have perfect foresight about group deviations, the stable coalitions can be larger and efficient. Our results are similar in this regard. We must also emphasize that our stable coalitions emerge from a refinement of Nash equilibrium. This method is quite distinct from the most common notions of coalition stability used in the literature, such as the notion of ‘internal and external stability’ originated by d’Aspremont et al. (1983). Different methods typically generate different outcomes.

We summarize our findings with respect to the effect of an expansion in the number of nations on the size of a stable multilateral coalition in the absence of attrition in the following proposition:

**Proposition 6. In the absence of attrition, the larger the global economy is, the larger will be the size of the stable multilateral green R&D agreement.**

We now provide results for the general model in which \( a \in [0,1] \). Table 2 shows that the types of stable coalition structures depend crucially on both the number of nations, \( Z \), and the attrition rate, \( a \). As demonstrated above, if \( a = 0 \), the resulting stable coalition structures will consist of a mix of multilateral and stand-alone nations, except for isolated bilateral agreements for \( Z < 7 \); that is, \((Z,D) = (3,1), (4,2), (5,3), \) and \((6,4)\). The equilibrium payoff for a stand-alone nation in the singleton coalition structure increases with \( Z \); it becomes larger than the common equilibrium payoff earned by bilateral nations in isolated bilateral agreements for all \( Z \geq 7 \).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Z$</th>
<th>Bilateral or Multilateral</th>
<th>Hub-and-Spoke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.256$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.397$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.126$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.296$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.157$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.388$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$D = 4$</td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.003$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.214$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.157$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.307$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.383$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$D = 4$</td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.151$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.241$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.312$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.38$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$D = 5$</td>
<td>$D = 4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 4$</td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.114$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.189$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.255$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.316$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.378$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>$D = 6$</td>
<td>$D = 5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 5$</td>
<td>$D = 4$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 3$</td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.083$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.146$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.112$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.209$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.264$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>$D = 1$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.319$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.377$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>$D = 7$</td>
<td>$D = 5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 6$</td>
<td>$D = 4$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 2$</td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($0 \sim 0.058$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.171$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.112$)</td>
<td>($\sim 0.221$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.27$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$D = 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.321$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($\sim 0.377$)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
For $a > 0$, we see that as the attrition rate increases, the stable coalition structures contain initially a mix of multilateral and stand-alone nations. Then, for higher attrition rates, it becomes a mix of hub-and-spoke agreements and stand-alone nations. For still higher attrition rates, it features a mix of isolated bilateral agreements and stand-alone nations. Finally, for sufficiently high attrition rates, it consists of stand-alone nations only.

5.2. Large economies without transfers

If coalitions do not allow income transfers, the number and types of PCPNE increase because there are several Nash equilibrium with asymmetric outcomes. The analysis is more complex, but we are able to provide some coherent results for the PCNPE and for the “second-best” structures for sufficiently low attrition rates. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate that the stable coalition structures can indeed be very large, encompassing all nations in globe. There are multiple types of stable coalition structures depending on the value of the attrition parameter. Table 3 provides the results for the general model in which $a \in [0,1]$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Z$</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>$2^{nd}$ Formation</th>
<th>$3^{rd}$ Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0 ~ .0691</td>
<td>Circle of 4 ( ~ .1319)</td>
<td>2 Bilateral ( ~ .3659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0 ~ .0442</td>
<td>Hub &amp; Circle of 4 ( ~ .0626)</td>
<td>Circle of 5 ( ~ .1751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0 ~ .0290</td>
<td>Circle of 6 + 6 Bilateral ( ~ .0425)</td>
<td>Circle of 6 + 3 Bilateral ( ~ .0687)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures 4-6 illustrate the Nash equilibrium payoffs as functions of the attrition rate. Figure 4 clearly shows that the second-best-stable formation is the “circle of four” in which all nations have two links, one link to each of its two neighbors. If $Z = 5$, Figure 5 shows that the second-best-stable formation is characterized by one nation being a hub (linked to the other four nations) and the other
four nations having two links. If $Z = 6$, Figure 6 shows that in the second-best-stable formation each nation is linked to four other nations.

Figure 4: PCPNE for $Z = 4$

Figure 5: PCPNE for $Z = 5$
First, it is important to note that the multilateral arrangement containing all nations is a PCPNE for sufficiently low attrition rates for economies with four, five and six nations. If the total number of nations is odd, the second-best-stable formation features a hub with a larger number of links than the spokes. If the total number of nations is even, the second-best-stable formation features a symmetric composition where all nations have the same number of links.

Table 4 expands the number of nations up to 197. The cut-off attrition rates in Table 4 are those that “separate” the stable Grand Coalition and the second-best coalitional structure. By considering larger economies, with up to 197 nations, we see that the two main findings described above are consistent throughout. If the attrition is sufficiently small, say \( a \leq 0.0000257689 \), the PCNPE will always involve all nations in the globe:

**Proposition 7.** If \( a \leq 0.0000257689 \), the PCPNE will be the Grand Coalition structure, which contains all 197 nations.
This is good news for international R&D agreements in which the benefits from R&D spillovers are perfectly excludable. In addition, the second-best PCPNE alternates depending on whether or not the total number of nations is odd – see Table 4 and Appendix F.

6. Concluding Remarks

Several nations are currently engaged in the production of CCS research in collaborative R&D networks. These networks are bilateral, multilateral and hub-and-spoke. Such networks are promising additions to the Paris Agreement. Hub-and-spoke networks, in particular, may allow the hub nation...
to partake on knowledge spillovers from several partners. The hub nation is likely to benefit from novel and non-redundant pieces of knowledge.

Our theoretical model also builds on recent empirical findings of studies of collaborative R&D that demonstrate that the productivity of R&D collaborations may crucially depend on some aspects related to social interactions among researchers. There is evidence that productivity in research teams correlates positively to team cohesiveness. A team is more cohesive the stronger are the ties among its team members. There is also evidence that cohesive R&D collaborations develop in order to alleviate or resolve problems of informational asymmetries within research teams. Thus, there appears to be a chain linking team efforts to alleviate inherent problems of informational asymmetries to the level of trust shared by team members and the latter to the team’s research productivity. We incorporate these notions in our model in a synthetic form. We assume that international research collaborations are typically subject to relational attrition, which erodes their efficiency rate. We also allow team size to erode the team’s efficiency rate.

We demonstrate that, conditional on the magnitude of the attrition rate, multilateral, hub-and-spoke and isolated bilateral agreements can be stable if agreements do not allow income transfers. Since the benefits generated by R&D sharing are larger the larger it is the number of nations that collaborate (directly or indirectly), multilateral agreements are Pareto superior for sufficiently small attrition rates, with hub-and-spoke agreements being second best.

If agreements allow transfers, multilateral agreements are never coalition-proof. Hub-and-spoke and isolated bilateral agreements are stable for different attrition rates. Comparing the stability results for agreements that prohibit transfers with agreements that allow transfers, we demonstrate that global welfare improves if agreements prohibit transfers for sufficiently low attrition rates.

We also considered the effects associated with enlarging the global economy. The findings depend on whether or not coalitions allow transfers. If coalitions allow transfers, the Grand Coalition is never stable. The size of a stable multilateral agreement increases as the size of the global economy expands.
in the absence of attrition. We also demonstrate that for positive attrition rates all types of coalition structures can be stable as the size of the global economy expands. On the other hand, if coalitions do not allow transfers, the Grand Coalition is stable for sufficiently small attrition rates even if the number of nations is very large. We also show that several other arrangements, with participation of almost all nations in the globe, are stable depending on the value of the attrition rate. The type of “second-best” stable arrangement differs if the number of nations in the globe is even or odd.

Our findings enable us to conjecture that the current international green R&D networks may be self-enforcing and may still increase in size, even in the presence of significant attrition.

References


Appendices

Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3

From Proposition 2, we know that $u_i^p = u_2^p > u_1^p$ for $a \in (0, 1]$ and from Proposition 1, we know that $u_i^M > u_2^M = u_3^M$ for $a \in (0, 1]$. From the conditions that determine the Nash equilibria for the contribution games, we obtain

\[
g^S = 1/4, \quad g_1^p = g_2^p = (3 + 3a + 2a^2)^{-1}, \quad g_3^p = (1 + a)(1 + 2a)/[2(3 + 3a + 2a^2)],
\]

\[
g_1^M = (5 + 10a + 3a^2)/(4\lambda_1), \quad g_2^M = g_3^M = 3(3 + 9a + 8a^2)/(8\lambda_1),
\]

\[
g^M = 3/(10 + 8a + 12a^2),
\]

where $\Delta_1 \equiv 4 + 13a + 16a^2 + 9a^3 + 3a^4$. From these results, we have

\[
u^S = w + \frac{7}{16}, \quad u^M = w + \frac{49 + 66a + 90a^2}{4(5 + 4a + 6a^2)^2}, \quad u^p_{h=1,2} = w + \frac{34 + 62a + 67a^2 + 36a^3 + 12a^4}{8(3 + 3a + 2a^2)^2},
\]

\[
u_3^p = w + \frac{17 + 30a + 29a^2 + 12a^3 + 4a^4}{4(3 + 3a + 2a^2)^2}, \quad u^M_{m=2,3} = u^M - \frac{a(2 + 3a)(2 + 9a + 6a^2)^2}{32\lambda_1},
\]

\[
u_1^M = w + (124 + 780a + 2099a^2 + 3100a^3 + 2685a^4 + 1326a^5 + 306a^6)/(16\Delta_1^2).
\]

Comparing these outcomes yields that $u_1^p = u_2^p > (\leq) u^S$ if $a < (\geq) 0.459224$, $u_1^p > (\leq) u^S$ if $a < (\geq) 0.280776$, $u_1^M > (\leq) u_2^p = u_3^p$ if $a < (\geq) 0.248912$, $u_2^M = u_3^M > (\leq) u_1^p = u_2^p$ if $a < (\geq) 0.185142$, $u_2^M > (\leq) u_2^M$ if $a < (\geq) 1/9$, $u_2^M > (\leq) u_2^M = u_3^M$ if $a < (\geq) 0.152027$, $u_2^M = u_2^M > (\leq) u^S$ if $a < (\geq) 0.292069$. These results are in the proof and summarized in Figure 1.

Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4

The Nash equilibria for the contribution games yield

\[
g_1^p = g_2^p = 4/(9 + 4a + 4a^2), \quad g_3^p = (1 + 4a + 4a^2)/[2(9 + 4a + 4a^2)],
\]

\[
g_1^M = 3(26 + 39a + 9a^2)/(4\Delta_2), \quad g_2^M = g_3^M = 9(14 + 31a + 24a^2)/(8\Delta_2),
\]

\[
g^M = 27/[2(41 + 6a + 18a^2)],
\]

where $\Delta_2 \equiv 52 + 108a + 87a^2 + 27a^3 + 9a^4$. From these results, we have
\[ u_1^{**} = u_2^{**} = w + \frac{307 + 216a + 264a^2 + 96a^3 + 48a^4}{8(9 + 4a + 4a^2)^2}, \]

\[ u_3^{**} = w + \frac{161 + 36\alpha + 152a^2 + 32a^3 + 16a^4}{4(9 + 4a + 4a^2)^2}, \]

\[ u^H = w + 3(68 + 132a + 81a^2)/8\Lambda_2, \quad u^M = w + 81/[4(41 + 6a + 18a^2)]. \]

By comparing these payoffs, we obtain that: 
\[ u_1^{**} > (\leq) u^S \quad \text{if} \quad a < (\geq) 0.914214, \]
\[ u_1^{**} = u_2^{**} > (\leq) u^S \quad \text{if} \quad a < (\geq) 0.41018, \quad u^{**} > (\leq) u^S \quad \text{if} \quad a < (\geq) 0.513799, \]
\[ u^{**} > (\leq) u_2^{**} = u_3^{**} \quad \text{if} \quad a < (\geq) 0.642148, \quad u^{**} < u_j^{**} \quad \forall a \in [0,1], \quad u^M < u_3^{**} \quad \forall a \in [0,1], \]
\[ u^{**} > (\leq) u^M \quad \text{if} \quad a < (\geq) 0.157355. \]

These results are in the proof and summarized in Figure 2.

**Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5**

By utilizing the results in Appendix B and C, we obtain that: 
\[ W^S = 3w + 21/16, \]
\[ W^P = 3w + (51 + 92a + 96a^2 + 48a^3 + 16a^4)/[4(3 + 3a + 2a^2)^2], \]
\[ W^H = 3w + (372 + 2332a + 6213a^2 + 8982a^3 + 7524a^4 + 3582a^5 + 810a^6)/[16(\Delta_2)^2], \]
\[ W^M = 3w + 3(49 + 66a + 90a^2)/[4(5 + 4a + 6a^2)^2], \quad W^M^* = 3w + 243/[4(41 + 6a + 18a^2)], \]
\[ W^{P*} = 3w + (13 + 4a + 4a^2)/(9 + 4a + 4a^2), \quad W^{H*} = 3w + 9(68 + 132a + 81a^2)/(8\Delta_2), \]

which yield that: 
\[ W^M > W^H \quad \text{if} \quad a < 0.135793, \quad W^H > W^P \quad \text{if} \quad a < 0.238574, \quad W^H > W^S \quad \text{if} \quad a < 0.30648, \quad W^M^* > W^{P*} \quad \text{if} \quad a < 0.513799, \quad W^{H*} > W^S \quad \text{if} \quad a < 0.391117, \quad W^M > W^{P*} \quad \text{if} \quad a < 0.0938257. \]

Since \( u_1^{**} = u_2^{**} > u^S \) for \( a < 0.41018 \), we are able to summarize the results in Figure 3.

**Appendix D: Large economies with transfers**

Solving the system of first order conditions for the structure with stand alone nations yields the Nash equilibrium payoffs for the contribution game: 
\[ \tilde{u}^S = w - c(\tilde{q}^S) + v(\tilde{Z}\tilde{q}^S). \]

In the hub-and-spoke partial coalitional structure, the hub nation 1 forms \( Z - D - 1 \) bilateral coalitions, while \( 1 \leq D < Z \) nation(s) form singleton coalition(s). In the third stage, the international arbitrator implements intra-coalitional transfers for all \( \{1, i\}, \ i = 2, \ldots, Z - D \).
coalitions. The first order conditions to the optimization problems imply that all transfers satisfy
\[ u_i = u_l \quad \text{and} \quad t_{il} + t_{li} = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad i = 2, \cdots, Z - D, \]
which yields
\[ t_{il}^{II} (g_1, \cdots, g_{Z-D}) = \frac{1}{(Z-D)} \left[ \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{Z-D} c(q_{ij}^{II}) - (Z-D-1) c(q_i^{II}) \right], \quad i = 2, \cdots, Z - D. \]

The first order conditions for the hub 1 and spoke \( i = 2, \cdots, Z - D \) in the first stage are
\[
\begin{align*}
\nu'(G) &= \frac{1}{(Z-D)} \left[ c'(q_i^{II}) e^{-1}(a, Z-D-1) - \sum_{i=2}^{Z-D} c'(q_i^{II}) / 2 \right], \quad (A.1) \\
\nu'(G) &= \frac{1}{(Z-D)} \left[ c'(q_i^{III}) e^{-1}(a,1) - c'(q_i^{III}) / (Z-D) \right]. \quad (A.2)
\end{align*}
\]

Summing (A.1) and (A.2) in the symmetric equilibrium with \( q_i^{II} = \tilde{q}_i^{II*} \) and \( q_i^{III} = \tilde{q}_s^{III*} \) for \( i = 2, \cdots, Z - D \), yields the Samuelson condition for \( Z - D \) nations’ hub-and-spoke structure; i.e.,
the sum of nations’ MRS’s of the public good in the LHS should equal to its MRT in the RHS:
\[
(Z-D) \nu'(G) = \frac{1}{(Z-D)} \left[ c'(\tilde{q}_i^{II*}) \left[ e^{-1}(a, Z-D-1) - (Z-D-1)/(Z-D) \right] + (Z-D-1) c'(\tilde{q}_s^{III*}) \left[ e^{-1}(a,1)-1/2 \right] \right].
\]

In the multilateral partial coalitions, the solution to the arbitrator’s problem in the second stage
satisfies that \( u_1 = \cdots = u_{Z-D} \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{Z-D} t_i = 0 \), which yields the intra-coalition income transfers for \( i = 1, \cdots, Z - D \) as follows:
\[ t_i^M (g_1, \cdots, g_{Z-D}) = \frac{1}{Z-D} \left[ (Z-D-1) c(q_i^M) - \sum_{j=i}^{Z-D} c(q_j^M) \right]. \]

The first order condition for \( i = 1, \cdots, Z - D \) in the second stage is
\[
\nu'(G) = \frac{1}{(Z-D)} c'(q_i^{II}) e^{-1}(a, Z-D-1) - \frac{1}{Z-D} \sum_{j=i}^{Z-D} c'(q_j^M), \quad (A.3)
\]
which yields \( q_i^M = \tilde{q}_i^{M*} \) since \( g_i^M = \tilde{g}_i^{M*} \) for \( i = 1, \cdots, Z - D \). Summing (A.3) yields the
Samuelson condition for \( Z - D \) members’ multilateral coalitions structure as follows:
\[
(Z-D) \nu'(G) = c'(\tilde{q}^{M*}) \left[ e^{-1}(a, Z-D-1) - (Z-D-1)/(Z-D) \right].
\]
Setting \( e(a,n-1) = \left[1 + a(n-1)\right]^{-1} \) and \( v(G) = G\left(1 - G/2\right) \) with the first order condition for Z members’ multilateral coalitions structure: \( Zv'(G) = c'\left(q^M\right)e^{-1}(a,Z-1) - (Z-1)/Z \), (2b) for \( i = 1, \ldots, D \), (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) yields Z nations economy’s outcomes summarized in Table 1 and 2.

**Appendix E: Large economies without transfers**

In multilateral networks containing \( Z \) nations, each nation forms \( Z-1 \) bilateral coalitions. The first order conditions are as follows:

\[
v'(G) = c'\left(q_i^M\right)e^{-1}(a,Z-1), \quad i = 1, \ldots, Z, \tag{A.4}
\]

which yields \( q_i^M = q^M \) since \( g_i^M = g^M \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, Z \). Since the maximum number of links for \( Z \) members is \( Z(Z-1)/2 \), subtracting 1 link between nations 1 and 2 from the multilateral coalitions structure (i.e., \( Z(Z-1)/2 - 1 \) bilateral agreements) can be characterized by equations (A.4) for \( i = 3, \ldots, Z \), and the following first order conditions:

\[
v'(G) = c'\left(q_j\right)e^{-1}(a,Z-2), \quad j = 1, 2. \tag{A.5}
\]

Setting \( e(a,n-1) = \left[1 + a(n-1)\right]^{-1} \) and \( v(G) = G\left(1 - G/2\right) \) in equations (A.4) and (A.5) and comparing the resulting utilities yield the corresponding cut-off attrition value. By subtracting another link from the above coalitions’ structure, comparing all the corresponding utilities, and repeating a similar way, we obtain the PCPNE for \( Z = 4, 5, 6 \) nations. The results are summarized in Table 3 and Figures 4-6.

Furthermore, if \( Z \geq 4 \) is an even number, the second-best stable formation is characterized by the equations (A.5) for \( i = 1, \ldots, Z \), which implies that each nation forms \( Z-2 \) bilateral coalitions and hence the total number of links is \( Z(Z-2)/2 \) in the second-best coalitional structure. For an odd number: \( Z \geq 5 \), it is impossible that each nation links up with an identical number of nations. In this case, the second-best stable formation becomes hub-and-spoke structure; i.e., one country is a
hub, linking with \( Z - 1 \) nations, and each spoke nation forms \( Z - 2 \) bilateral agreements. The corresponding equilibria can be characterized by the equations (A.4) for the hub nation and (A.5) for the other \( Z - 1 \) members. In this case, the total number of links is \( (Z - 1)^2 / 2 \). These second-best stable formations and those cut-off attrition values are summarized in Table 4.

Appendix F: Second-Order Conditions for the Maximization Problems

Singleton: \[
\frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial g_i^2} = -c''(g_i) + v''(G) < 0, \quad i = 1, 2, 3.
\]

Partial: \[
\frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial g_i^2} = \left[ -c''(q_i) e^{-1}(a,1) + v''(G) \right] e^{-1}(a,1) < 0, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]

Hub-and-Spoke: \[
\frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial g_i^2} = \left[ -c''(q_i) e^{-1}(a,2) + v''(G) \right] e^{-1}(a,2) < 0.
\]

Partial with Transfers: \[
\frac{\partial^2 (u_i - \bar{u})(u_i - \bar{u})}{\partial t_i^2} = -2 < 0, \quad i = 1, 2,
\]
\[
\frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial g_i^2} = -\frac{1}{2} \left\{ c''(q_i) \left[ e^{-1}(a,1) \right]^2 + \frac{1}{4} c''(q_j) \right\} + v''(G) e^{-1}(a,1) < 0.
\]

Hub-and-Spoke with Transfers: \[
\frac{\partial^2 (u_i - \bar{u})(u_i - \bar{u})}{\partial t_i^2} = -2 < 0, \quad i = 2, 3,
\]
\[
\frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial g_i^2} = -\frac{1}{3} \left\{ c''(q_i) \left[ e^{-1}(a,1) \right]^2 + \frac{1}{9} c''(q_j) \right\} + v''(G) e^{-1}(a,1) < 0, \quad i = 2, 3.
\]

Multilateral Coalition with Transfers:
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \prod_{k=1}^{3} (u_j - \bar{u})}{\partial t_j^2} = -2(u_j - \bar{u}) < 0, \quad i, j = 1, 2, 3, \quad i \neq j,
\]
\[
\frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial g_i^2} = -\frac{1}{3} \left\{ c''(q_i) \left[ e^{-1}(a,1) \right]^2 + \frac{1}{9} c''(q_j) \right\} + v''(G) e^{-1}(a,2) < 0, \quad i = 1, 2, 3.
\]