Research on the micro-foundations of institutions has devoted less attention to how institutional logics shape micro-politics - i.e., the micro-processes by which people influence organizational decisions. Conversely, an extensive literature has shown that micro-politics is key to explain organizational decisions but has neglected how such micro-politics is embedded in broader institutional logics. To address these gaps, in this paper I study how change agents socialized in an institutional logic can influence decision-making in a centralized organization dominated by a different logic. I conducted a historical case study of a strategic change decision in the project organization that built Chicago’s Millennium Park. Drawing on detailed micro-interaction data from two primary archives, triangulated with interviews and secondary historical data, I develop a process model that makes three contributions. First, I show that a dominant logic constrains even well-resourced change agents by setting “rules for appropriateness” that shape how they can legitimately use their resources. Second, I show that a dominant logic can also counter-intuitively facilitate strategic change by making incumbents, who are socialized in such logic, overconfident of their control of the status-quo. Third, I show that change agents can politically capitalize on incumbents’ overconfidence of control by building an alternative coalition via three practices: 1) anticipating and preventing conflict; 2) role decoupling; 3) turning incumbents into allies by exploiting their biographical contradictions. I refer to the nexus of these micro-practices as “unobtrusive action” defined as a form of micro-politics aimed at preventing potential opposition while simultaneously shaping the perceptions of potential opponents to turn them into allies.